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THE GLOBAL COMPACT, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES, AND
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
AFSHIN AKHTARKHAVARI*

Unlike rules, international lawyers commonly ignore the potential that
environmental principles have to create change in internationallaw and politics.
Transnational actors do not easily conform to abstract and open-textured
environmentalprinciples because they do not prescribe a specific way of behaving
and compliance with them is difficult to enforce. The Global Compact initiative of
the United Nations relies on principles to create a regime applying to
transnational corporations.It is structured around encouraging corporations to
socially learn rather than to comply with norms. In this context environmental
principles within the Global Compact have the potential to create significant
change in internationalpolitics but one that is better assessed in terms of how they
frame ideas during the interactions of participants and stakeholders within the
regime. This interplay between environmentalprinciples and the social influence
of ideas is an important steering mechanism for the kind of learning that
potentially is taking place within the Global Compact. It also distinguishes the
Global Compact from other attempts to consider the role of internationally
developed voluntary codes as a common frame for multinationalcorporations to
self-regulate themselves. Notably, it highlights an important role andfunction for
environmental principles, which are often discounted in their potential to
contribute to change at the internationallevel.
I. INTRODUCTION

In December 2005, the 191 Member States of the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) officially endorsed the Global Compact (GC) initiative that the
former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, established within his office in 2000.1 In a
much generalized but useful summary of its mission, the GC seeks to establish
"corporate citizenship among companies" in the world.2 The GC is now a complex
BSc/LLB , LLM, PhD. Senior Lecturer, Griffith Law School. I wish to thank Professor Donald
Rothwell for his comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1. United Nations, General Assembly, Towards Global Partnerships,U.N. GAOR, 62d Sess.,
Agenda Item 61 at 3, U.N. Doc A/C.2/62/L.33/Rev.1 (Dec. 3, 2007); GEORG KELL, UNITED NATIONS
GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, LETTER TO GLOBAL COMPACT STAKEHOLDER 1, (2006) available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about the_gc/stakeholder letter 2006.pdf.
2. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, ASSESSING THE GLOBAL COMPACT'S IMPACT 2 (2004), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news events/9.1 news archives/2004 06 09/impass.pdf. This
study is a "comprehensive impact assessment" of the GC that was commissioned by the Global
Compact Office (GCO) in 2004 and completed on May 11, 2004. It does not actually define what it
understands "corporate citizenship" to mean in the context of the GC. On this point, see Surya Deva,
Global Compact: A Critique of the U.N.'s "Public-Private" Partnershipfor Promoting Corporate
Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 107, 111-113 (2006) (discussing the possible definitions
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initiative that is coordinated by the Global Compact Office (GCO) and is part of
the Secretary-General's Office at the United Nations (UN). As of September
2007, the GC had 4600 participants and stakeholders from around 120 countries in
the world. This compares with 2900 participants and stakeholders in March 2006
when the GCO last reported on the growth of the initiative. This is not to suggest
that the GC is without its challenges or criticisms.6 The "symbolism of the Global
Compact's creation and its established brand as a major initiative of the SecretaryGeneral" is, however, "surprisingly influential."
The core idea behind the GC initiative is to establish a set of ten principles
that aim to influence the values of corporations in relation to human rights, labor,
the environment, and corruption, and "give a human face to the global market."
The environmental principles that are a part of the GC are listed as: the
precautionary approach to environmental challenges; promoting greater
environmental responsibility; and encouraging the development and diffusion of
environmentally friendly technologies.9 In 2004, McKinsey & Company were

of "corporate citizenship" and "corporate social responsibility"). For the use of this terminology, refer
to the recent report produced by the GCO and the Barcelona Centre for the Support of the Global
Compact on Loack Networks, BARCELONA CENTER FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT,

LOCAL NETWORK REPORT, (UN Global Compact Office 2007) available at http://www.
unglobalcompact.org/docs/news-events/8.1/LNReport FINAL.pdf [hereinafter LOCAL NETWORK
REPORT]. Others have summarized the purpose of the GC in different ways. For instance, King has
suggested that "in its simplest form" it is about the "dissemination of and adherence to good business
practices." Betty King, The UN Global Compact: Responsibilityfor Human Rights, Labor Relations,
and the Environment in Developing Nations, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481, 482 (2001).
3. The review and actual changes to the GC framework are good illustrations of this complexity.
See KELL, supranote 1, at 2.
4. LOCAL NETWORK REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. But cf David Weissbrodt, Business and
Human Rights, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 70 (2005) (asking "[w]hat about the other 59,000 companies that
are not covered by the Global Compact?").
5. KELL, supranote 1.
6. See Deva, supranote 2, at 128-29; See also Maria Gjolberg & Audun Ruud, The U.N. Global
Compact-A Contribution to Sustainable Development?, 7 (Ctr. for Dev. and Env't, Univ. of Oslo,
Working Paper No. 1/05,2006); See also David M. Bigge, Bring on the Bluewash: A Social
Constructivist Argument Against Using Nike v Kasky to Attack the UN Global Compact, 14 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP. 6, 12-14 (2004), (summarizing the major early criticisms of the GC, particularly in
relation to companies and human rights).
7. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, supra note 2, at 13. It is arguable that its success is partly because
many corporations use the GC as a branding exercise and for networking opportunities. For instance, in
a report compiled in 2007 by the GCO, it was noted that 6 3 % of the 400 companies surveyed indicated
that they had joined the GC to increase trust in their company. This is compared to 52% highlighting the
fact that they wanted to address humanitarian concerns. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, U.N. GLOBAL
COMPACT ANNUAL REVIEW 2007 LEADERS SUMMIT 9,
11 (2007), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news events/8.1/GCAnnualReview2007.pdf
[hereinafter
ANNUAL REVIEW 2007].
8. Press Release, Secretary General Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour,
Environment, in address to World Economic Forum in Davos, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html.
9. U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AbouttheGC
/TheTENPrinciples/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). The other seven principles of the GC are:
(1) "Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights";
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commissioned by the GCO to complete an "impact assessment" of the GC
initiative.10 This study singled out as the main focus for its empirical investigations
the adoption by companies of the nine principles as they were in 2004.11 It found
that in the four years since its establishment, the:
Global Compact has had noticeable, incremental impact on companies,
the UN, governments and other civil society actors and has built a
strong base for future results. The Compact has primarily accelerated
policy change in companies, while catalyzing a proliferation of
"partnership projects," development-oriented activities that companies
undertake with UN agencies and other partners. The Compact has also
developed a solid participant base and local network structure,
establishing itself as the largest voluntary corporate citizenship network
of its kind. 12
Figure 1, which is from the McKinsey & Company study, provides more
perspective on these comments in that 51% of those surveyed said that the GC
initiatives helped them to make the decision to engage with the principles easier as
opposed to initiating their interest in them. Despite this, the study highlights that
the principles used by the GC have the potential to socialize individual actors into
changing their preferences in some way.

(2) "make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses"; (3) "Businesses should uphold the
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining"; (4) "the
elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour"; (5) "the effective abolition of child labour";
(6) "the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation"; and (10) "Businesses
should work against corruption in all of its forms, including extortion and bribery." Id.
10. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, supranote 2, at 1.
11. A tenth principle dealing with anti-corruption was added to the other nine in 2004. See U.N.
Global
Compact,
Transparency and Anti-corruption, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
abouttheGC/thetenprinciples/anti-corruption.html (last visited November 15, 2008). As a secondary
focus, the study by McKinsey & Company also examined the "increased efficacy of the UN through a
more collaborative approach to the private sector, support for governments seeking to spur a more
effective role of business in society, and the convening of a unique multi-stakeholder network."
McKiNSEY & COMPANY, supra note 2, at 2.
12. McKINSEY & COMPANY, supra note 2, at 2. They also note criticisms, such as that the
"inconsistent participation and divergent and unmet expectations limit the impact on companies and
continue to threaten the Compact's long-term credibility with participants." Id. at 2.

280

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:2

Figure 1 Impact of Global Compact on Company Reform13

Percent of company respondents
Were any of these [policy] changes helped by your organization's participation in the Compact?
The changes would not
Change would have been difficult to implement
without being a participant

Changes would have
happened anyway, but
participation made it

have happened without being a
participant

Participation had no
significant impact

significantly easier or bmught
change torward signiicantly

Percent of respondenis who indicated sonme
change made since Joinkig Compact ( who made up 67% fall)
Source: Survey of GC partlits
For most of the survey respondents who report that their companies nde changes to implement the Compacts
principles, particiuation in the Compact accelerated, ratier than instigated the change.

The difficulty of studying principles by simply asking whether companies or
other stakeholders have complied with or internalized them is that it is easy to
ignore the abstract and open-textured nature of these norms. 14 Whether
corporations have been socialized into adopting them does not actually mean that
different corporations associate with the norm in the same way. In other words, we
are no better off knowing what function or role norms play within the Global
Compact itself because of the variety of different ways that companies can
interpret them.
Instead of assessing the significance of the principles in terms of how well
actors comply with them or feel obligated to change their behavior based on their
normative pull, this article takes a different perspective on such issues." It

13. Id. at 4.
14. An alternative criticism of the McKinsey & Company study might relate to how it singled out
the impact that the principles of the GC had on the corporations and stakeholders without taking into
account other international initiatives. See also William Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the
UN Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 501, 504 (2001) (discussing the
abstract nature of the human rights provisions of the GC in the context of other measures
internationally).
15. The ability of the GC to encourage compliance with its principles has already been studied by
others. Importantly, see VILJAM ENGSTROM, REALIZING THE GLOBAL COMPACT (U. Helsinki Faculty of

Law 2002); Meyer & Stefanova, supra note 14; Elisa Morgera, The UN and CorporateEnvironmental
Responsibility: Between InternationalRegulation and Partnerships, 15 REv. EUR. CMTY. & INT'L
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examines whether the GC framework coordinated through the GCO is potentially
changing and instantiating a collective culture globally whereby environmentally
conscious approaches to consumption and production constitute the way
corporations will view their relationship with nature. 16 This is not a normative
argument about whether the initiative is good or bad for the environment, but
rather an expression of the kind of deeper cultural change in international politics
that this initiative potentially is creating if it continues to develop.17 It is argued
that in this sense the role and function of environmental principles within the GC is
better assessed in terms of how they frame ideas during the interactions of
participants and stakeholders within the regime. This interplay between
environmental principles and the social influence of ideas is an important steering
mechanism for the kind of learning that potentially is taking place within the GC.
It also distinguishes this discussion from other attempts to consider the role of
internationally developed voluntary codes as a common frame for multinational
corporations to self-regulate themselves.1 8
This article begins by describing the GC, highlighting the way some of the
initiatives of the GCO give structure to the engagement of corporate participants
and stakeholders. The GC was selected for this study because, through it,
transnational and other kinds of corporations directly and diffusely engage with
each other and stakeholders at the international level using environmental
principles. It is also because it embeds the principles within an institutional
structure that relies more on social influence than coercive mechanisms that
emphasize immediate gains. The environmental principles of the GC are examined
as abstract and open-textured norms. The article then argues that collective
learning is in fact possible for multinational corporations at the international level.
It examines what it means for them to instantiate a collective culture of responding
in an environmentally responsible way to consumerism and production. The
following sections discuss two different social processes facilitated by the GC to
influence corporations to act in a way that will instantiate the collective learning of
a culture of stronger environmental stewardship by corporations. This article
concludes by discussing how, through social influence, environmental principles
ENVTL. L. 93 (2006). Gjolberg & Ruud have also observed based on interviews with some Norwegian
members of the GC that the companies felt they would "benefit from the legitimacy of the UN/GC
while the voluntary nature and the abstract ten principles of the GC" would "make it hard to evaluate
compliance." Gjolberg & Ruud, supra note 6, at 12.
16. For a different consideration of this question in the broader context of sustainable governance,
see Surya Deva, Sustainable Good Governance and Corporations: An Analysis of Asymmetries , 18
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 707 (2006).
17. For other attempts to situate the work of the GC in international relations topics, see Meyer &
Stefanoya, supra note 14. See also, Bigge, supra note 6, at 7-8 (attempting to situate the GC within
social constructivist work in international relations).
18. On corporate responsibility through codes of conduct, see Sean D. Murphy, Taking
MultinationalCorporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389 (2005);
Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Convergence, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility: Corporate
Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1075, 1090 (2002); Ilias Bantekas, Corporate
Social Responsibility in InternationalLaw, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309, 322 (2004); DEBORAH LEIPZIGER,
THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY CODE BOOK (2003).
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can help instantiate a collectively understood culture that moves away from
excessive consumerism and production. This type of change deeply influences the
nature of international cooperation amongst states and corporations, as well as
normative developments in the system.
II. THE GLOBAL COMPACT, THE UNITED NATIONS,

AND ENVIRONMENTAL

PRINCIPLES

As far back as 1974, the UN, through the Commission on Transnational
Corporations, took initiatives to develop a Code of Conduct for transnational
corporations to establish a legal framework of some form to regulate what they
do. 19 It has been argued that the "UN's attempt to regulate transnational companies
through its Code of Conduct produced 20 years of debate and negotiations, but
yielded no results."20 The failed attempts to agree on how to manage corporations
are seen as the reason for an absence in the international political economy
literature of discussions of codes of conduct for transnational corporations of any
sort between the 1980s and 1990s.21 Only in the late 1990s, with the resurgence of
discussions on corporate responsibility built around the Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights,22 did UN bodies develop a renewed interest in
international codes of conduct. The GC initiative needs to be viewed in this
19. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 33-34, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/1 1
(1974), available at http://unctc.unctad.org/data/e74iia6a.pdf The Commission on Transnational
Corporations was asked by UN ECOSOC to "evolve" a "set of recommendations, which, taken together
would represent a code of conduct for governments and TNCs to be considered and adopted by the
Council." On this topic, see Barbara Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations in the Protection of InternationalHuman Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 166
(1997); Sidney Dell, The United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, in
EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION: CASE STUDIES IN CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY 53 (Johan Kaufann, ed. 1989).

Peter T. Muchlinski, Attempts to Extend the Accountability of TransnationalCorporations:The Role of
UNCTAD, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (Menno

T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi, eds., 2000).
20. Georg Kell, The Global Compact, Selected Experiences and Reflections, 59 J. BUS. ETHICS 69,
73 (2005).
21. Kathryn Sikkink, Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the
WHO/UNICEF Code, 40 INT'L ORG. 815 (1986).
22. See the 2003 revised version, UN ESCOCOR, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business
Enterpriseswith Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (August 13, 2003).
Although this initiative has so far failed, the ideas contained within the UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of TNCs contributed, for instance, to a consultation paper that the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights and the GCO produced in conjunction with the 2005 Business
Leaders Initiative on Human Rights. BUSINESS LEADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED
NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, AND OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A GUIDE

FOR INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (2005) available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues doc/human rights/Resources/guide hr.pdf.
For
a
discussion of the UN Norms and Responsibilities of TNCs in terms of the role of the UN and states in
developing it, see Larry C. Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United
Nations' Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsas a Harbinger of Corporate
Social Responsibility in InternationalLaw, 73 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 288 (2006).
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context, particularly its adoption of the softer approach through the ten principles
mentioned earlier. The overall mission and objectives of the GC are defined
broadly as follows: "[To] be the world's most inclusive voluntary initiative to
promote responsible corporate citizenship, ensuring that business, in partnership
with other societal actors, plays its essential part in achieving the United Nations'
vision of a more sustainable and equitable global economy."23
Two objectives which the GCO seeks to pursue in giving shape to this
mission are stated as:
*

*

Making the Compact and its principles on human rights, labor,
environment, and anti-corruption an integral part of business
operations and activities everywhere.
Encouraging and facilitating dialogue and partnerships among key
stakeholders in support of the ten principles and broader UN goals,
such as the Millennium Development Goals.24

The mission statement and the objectives of the GC confirm the fact that it
seeks to do more than just identify ten principles with which corporations must
comply. Although at first glance the GC initiatives appear to be a code of conduct
or a "third-party" "principled code, the broader governance framework,26 which
is coordinated by the GCO, is also relevant when it comes to differentiating this
initiative from others at the international level-such as the Guidelines for
27
This is important because the GCO seeks to involve
MultinationalEnterprises.
corporations in its work in direct and diffuse ways rather than assume that they are
passive recipients of an international code of practice. It is therefore this broader
framework established by the GC that engages and manages the external relations
of corporations with other participants, stakeholders, and the ten core principles as
the pivot around which the governance structure of the GC is built.
The GC has sought to develop from the beginning as an initiative with a
variety of different participants and stakeholders. It brings transnational and other
kinds of corporations together with UN agencies, labor, civil society organizations,
and governments in an effort, to use the words of the GCO itself, "to advance
universal environmental and social principles in order to foster a more sustainable

23. U.N.

GLOBAL

COMPACT

OFFICE,

WHAT

IS

A

LOCAL

NETWORK?

1,

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/networks-around world doc/What is a Local Network.pdf
(last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
24. United Nations, supranote 1.
25. See, Christopher Wright & Alexis Rwabizambuga, Institutional Pressures, Corporate
Reputation, and Voluntary Codes of Conduct: An Examinationof the Equator Principles, 111(1) BUS.
Soc. REV. 89, 93 (2006).
26. The term "governance framework" was more recently coined by the GCO to describe the
range of activities that it coordinates to "foster greater involvement in, and ownership of, the initiative
by participants and other stakeholders." ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supra note 7, at 16.
27. THE ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (OECD 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/

56/36/1922428.pdf.
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and inclusive world economy." 28 Corporations are referred to as participants in the
GC and as of 2007 over 3,000 corporations from 116 countries were members of
the GC.29 The term "stakeholder" refers to anyone else who is a member of the
GC.3 0 Figure 2 represents the increasing percentage of non-business stakeholders
in the GC initiative. It also suggests that the multi-stakeholder approach has
developed across the globe, given that the increase in both business and nonbusiness participation matches the increase in the number of countries involved in
the GC. Although in a useful critique of this development, it has been suggested
that there is a regional imbalance in both participants and stakeholders in the GC.31
Figure 3 represents the diversity of the stakeholders other than corporations that
have engaged with the GC initiative. This suggests that the engagement of nonbusiness stakeholders with the GC is very diverse and potentially strong as a result.
Figure 2 Stakeholders in the Global Compact32

TOTAL
GLOBAL
COMPACT
STAKEHOLDERS
Eulnes

COUNTRIES
WITH
GLOBAL
COMPACT
STAKEHOLDERS

EWon-usinese
40

30-O
2500m
2000

Z 1500

100
80
60
zd 40
20
0

20O 2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

2000 2001
2002
2003 2004 2005 2006

28. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT: ADVANCING

CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 1 (UN Global Compact Office 2005) available at http://www.unglobal
compact.org /docs/about the_gc/2.0.2.pdf.
29. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supranote 7, at 8.
30. Surya Deva, Global Compact: A Critique of the U.N.'s "Public-Private"Partnershipfor
PromotingCorporate Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 107, 115 (2006) (discussing the
obligations of a "stakeholder").
31. Id. at 134-36.
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Figure 3 Non-Business Participants by Type 33
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The GCO spearheads the GC. It is located within the executive office of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations because of the way it networks itself
through various "core agencies" of the UN.3 The placement of the GC within the
UN means that it is ultimately backed by states. In fact, Kell identifies some
governments as playing a very strong role in the formation of the GC. 5 Their
continuing involvement with the GC has been characterized as auxiliary in nature
"through outreach support, advocacy, and funding." 36 In an official communication
from the GCO, the role of states is also described as giving the "essential
legitimacy and universality to the principles of the Compact." 37
The GCO has identified three ways that it seeks to engage with corporate
participants, the range of stakeholders represented in Figure 3, agencies of the UN,
and the ten core principles of the GC.38 They include: (1) getting commitment from
the leadership of companies who are participants of the GC; (2) developing and

32. ANNUAL REVIEW2007, supranote 7, at 7.
33. Id. at 13-15.
34. These include the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), the
International Labor Organization (ILO), The UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN
Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Id. at 16; Kell, supranote 20, at 75.
35. Kell, supra note 20 at 74 (noting that the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, and Germany
provided practical and financial support in forming and initially developing the GC).
36. Georg Kell & David Levin, The Global Compact Network: An Historic Experiment in
Learningand Action, 108(2) Bus. Soc. REv. 151,153 (2003).
37. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT: ADVANCING

CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 4 (UN Global Compact Office
.unglobalcompact.org /docs/about the_gc/2.0.2.pdf
38. ANNUAL REVIEW2007, supranote 7, at 9-10.

2005)

available at http://www
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implementing policies relating to the ten core principles and ensuring that the
relevant people at the grassroots engage with them; and (3) ensuring that
participants communicate their progress in relation to the principles. 39 The GCO
has a variety of established practices that seek to enhance the engagement of the
different groups with the core principles. To help develop and implement policies,
two strategies supported by the GCO stand out.
The first is the establishment of the GC Local Networks (GCLN), which are
defined as "clusters of participants who come together to advance the Global
Compact and its principles at the local level." 40 The GCO has managed to establish
a very large number of GCLN to support its work within countries around the
world.41 Since 2000, when the first four GCLN were established, they have now
multiplied to over sixty-one with another twenty-five apparently in development.42
In an overview of GCLN, the GCO has said that they are meant to be "moving
innovative solutions upstream for global replication and multiplication, or... taking
global dialogue issues down to the level of implementation." 43 This means that
GCLNs help companies to implement the ten core principles and to facilitate their
reporting obligations as participants in the GC.4
The second strategy is the idea that the GCO supports the learning process for
all involved through a variety of activities such as conferences and workshops that
seek to enhance the understanding of participants and stakeholders in relation to
the core principles. 45 Through these activities, the GCO has, for instance, published
a number of case studies and analysis to enhance the engagement of different
groups.46 Other UN agencies have also worked with stakeholders to develop
materials to support the learning environment for corporations. For instance, in

2005, the UNDP, along with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, produced a
practical guide for companies operating in developing countries.47 The guide aimed
to assist companies with implementing the principles into their business operations
in developing countries. Although the initiatives in this area appear very strong,
whether or not corporations actually engage with the learning process is yet to be
tested empirically.48

39. Id. at 9.
40. LOCAL NETWORK REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
(2003),

Id. at 15.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 8.
See LOCAL NETWORK REPORT, supra note 2, at 25.
Id.
See U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTANABILITY
available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news events/8.1/expman.pdf; See also

U.N.

GLOBAL

COMPACT,

FROM

PRINCIPLES

TO

PRACTICE

(2003),

available

at

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news events/8.1/princ-prac.pdf.
47. KPMG, IMPLEMENTING THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT: A BOOKLET FOR INSPIRATION (2005),
available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news-events/8.1/dk book e.pdf.
48. Gjolberg & Ruud, supra note 6, at 11-12 (discussing the hesitation of corporations to engage
in the GC learning process).
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An important dimension of engaging corporations with other participants and
stakeholders is the requirement that all corporations produce an annual
Communication on Progress (COP) which they must share with stakeholders and
also post on the official website of the GC. 49 As a voluntary and non-legally
binding arrangement, the reporting process of the GC is the only compulsory
aspect of membership for corporations. To remain an "active member" of the GC,
a corporation must submit its COP annually. 50 A COP must contain a statement
that shows the continued support of the corporation for the core principles,
describes what actions they have taken to implement the principles and whether
they have engaged in partnership projects that support the goals of the UN more
generally, and indicates how they have succeeded in meeting their goals using
indicators or metrics available to them.5 1 The GCO has reported that it has made
600 companies "inactive" for not having submitted their COP in the manner
required by the GCO.52 The main reason given for deactivating the membership of
companies who do not report is to maintain the integrity of the initiative. June
2005 was the first time that all corporations who had been members of the GC for
more than two years had to officially report.54 The GCO reported that 87% of the
102 Global 500 companies had reported. 5 However, only 25% and 11% of the
medium-sized and small companies, respectively, had reported in 2005.56 The
reporting carried out by the larger companies is impressive to say the least. What it
says about smaller and medium sized companies is that the benefits of membership
might not warrant the need to support the GC's initiatives. Alternatively, the costs
of reporting might be high. Whatever the reason, it appears that the types of
corporations reporting are predominantly the larger transnational corporations,
which might benefit from the kind of citizenship that is established through the

GC.
A. EnvironmentalPrinciplesof the Global Compact
A study by the Trade Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2000 compared 246 voluntary codes of
conduct that corporations of the OECD's twenty-nine member states could adopt.
49. U.N.GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, POLICY FOR "COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS (COP)" 2-3

(2009),

available

at

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/communication

on_progress/COP

Policy.pdf [hereinafter POLICY FOR COP]; U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, LEADING

THE WAY IN

COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS 4 (2006), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs
/communication onprogress/4.3/leading the way.pdf [hereinafter LEADING THE WAY].
50. This requirement kicks in two years after joining the GC, ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supra note
7, at 51.
51. POLICY FOR COP, supra note 49.
52. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supranote 7, at 51.
53. POLICY FOR COP, supra note 49, at 2-3.
54. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, THE GLOBAL COMPACT COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS: A STATUS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS 1 (2005), available at http://www.unglobal
compact.org /docs/news events/9.1 news archives/2005_07_15/statrep cop2.pdf.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id.
57. Trade Committee and the Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises, Codes of Corporate Conduct: Expanded Review of their Contents 2 (Org. for Econ. Co-
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The study found that "environmental stewardship" was "one of the most heavily
cited of the areas in the extended inventory." 8 It noted that 145 out of the 246
codes dealt with environmental issues, and twenty-four were exclusively dedicated
to them. 59 However, given that a majority of these 246 codes discussed in the
Codes of Corporate Conduct Study are developed by companies themselves, or by
associations of various kinds, it is fair to presume that they deal with either product
or process standards. 60 Research suggests that directly regulating particular
activities of transnational corporations is achieved more effectively through
"narrowly defined issues" within codes of conduct. 61 This suggests that, although
there is nothing novel about another voluntary code, the fact that the GC adopts
just three environmental principles to apply to corporations is somewhat unique.
Much has been made of the inability of the general and short statements that
make up the principles of the GC to provide a detailed and potentially useful frame
62
for regulating corporate activities. This is the case even amongst participants of
the GC who have commented on how the brevity of the principles has little effect
in terms of regulating what they do. 63 The principles of the GC have been referred
to by those involved in its design as aspirations,64 or shared values.65 The GC's
documents themselves refer to the principles as a value-based platform.66 Whether
or not they are aspirations or values of transnational or local corporations is an
empirical question that does not seem as important as identifying how they might
function as abstract and open-textured norms within the GC framework.
The three principles as abstract and open-textured norms rely on international
environment law, defined broadly, for their meaning. Based on the origin of the
three environmental principles, it is apparent that the GC constructed these

principles in an abstract and open-textured way. The three principles are drawn
from the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,67 and Agenda
operation and Dev., Working Paper No. 2001/6, 2001), [hereinafter Trade Committee] available at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/24/1922656.pdf.
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id.
60. The distinction between product and process standards is from Philipp Pattberg, The Influence
of GlobalBusiness Regulation: Beyond GoodCorporate Conduct, 111 Bus. Soc. REv. 241, 244 (2006);
Trade Committee, supra note 57, at 5 (identifying that 48% of the voluntary codes were developed by
companies; 37% through associations; 13% as partnerships of stakeholders; and 2% by international
organizations).
61. Sikkink, supranote 21, at 816.
62. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 425; Klaus M. Leisinger, Opportunitiesand Risks of the United
Nations Global Compact, 11 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 113, 114, 116 (2003); Deva, supra note 2, at 12933.
63. Gjolberg & Ruud, supranote 6, at 14-16.
64. John G. Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain-Issues,Actors, and Practices, 10
EuR. J. INT'L REL. 499, 516 (2004).
65. Kell & Levin, supranote 36, at 152.
66. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 9.
67. Conference on the Environment and Development, Rio De Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992,
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992); See David Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development: Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa, 29 GA. L. REv. 599 (1995)
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21,68 which were developed for the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED). 69 As a result, the GC uses ideas from within the
broader international environmental legal framework that states have been
responsible for developing since 1992 in applying the environmental principles to
corporations.
The differences between the three principles are noteworthy. Principle 7 of
the GC requires that "business should support a precautionary approach to
environmental challenges."70 The fact that the GC adopted the term "precautionary
approach" from Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, instead of the term
"precautionary principle," which is also commonly used in the general literature,71
suggests that it sought to draw on the legitimacy of the document for the origin of
the norm. 2 The more detailed definition of the precautionary approach in Principle
15 of the Rio Declaration is also used in the GC documents to support the
abbreviated way that it is stated as Principle 7 of the GC itself.73 Put in this way,

(commenting on the Rio Declaration); Ileana M. Porras, The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for
InternationalCooperation, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Philippe Sands ed., 1993); Marc
Pallemaerts, InternationalEnvironmental Law From Stockholm to Rio: Back to the Future?, in
GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, supra.
68. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, AGENDA 21, [hereinafter AGENDA 21]available
at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21. AGENDA 21 was designed to clarify the scope
of the environmental principles in the Rio Declaration but also contained principles of its own right.
NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES
312 (2005).
69. U.N. Global Compact, Environment, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC
/TheTenPrinciples/environment.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (listing the environmental principles
and describing their origins); See David Freestone, The Road from Rio: InternationalEnvironmental
Law after the Earth Summit, 6 J. ENVTL. L. 193, 209-16 (1994) (discussing the impact of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development from the perspective of environmental norms).
70. U.N. Global Compact, supranote 69.
71. Importantly, Art. 14 of the 2003 revised version of the Norms on the Responsibilities of
TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights adopts the
term "precautionary principle," U.N. ECOSOC 55th Sess., 22d mtg., U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
72. There are a variety of different views on the difference between a precautionary principle and
a precautionary approach. See Jacqueline Peel, Precaution-A Matter of Principle, Approach or
Process? 5 MELB. J. INT. LAW 483 (2004). As to the concept of the precautionary principle, See Arie
Trouwborst, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in General InternationalLaw: Combating the Babylonian
Confusion, 16 REv. EUR. COM. & INT. ENv. LAW 185, 186-87 (2007); ARIE TROUWBORST,
PRECAUTIONARY RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES (2006).
73. Principle 15 of the RIO DECLARATION states that:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc.
A/CONF 151/26, 31 ILM 874 (June 13, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticlelD= 1163.
This
exact definition is also adopted by the GC as the definition of the precautionary approach for
businesses. See U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles Principle 7, http://www.
unglobalcompact.org /AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle7.html (last visited Nov.15, 2009).

290

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:2

the precautionary approach appears more as a heuristic device that is stated in an
abstract way as one of the GC principles. As a heuristic device, it refers to an
articulation of an established set of ideas, which are stated in more open-textured
fashion in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.
Principle 8 of the GC requires that "businesses should undertake initiatives to
promote greater environmental responsibility." 74 Unlike the precautionary
approach, this principle is extracted from Chapter 30 of Agenda 21, which is more
generally dedicated to the role of businesses and industry. 5 First, the GC draws
from two different places to develop the potential intersubjectivity around the
vague idea of assuming greater environmental responsibility. 76 The GC refers to
Chapter 30.26 of Agenda 21 which requires that transnational corporations:
[s]hould ensure responsible and ethical management of products and
processes from the point of view of health, safety and environmental
aspects. Towards this end, business and industry should increase selfregulation, guided by appropriate codes, charters and initiatives
integrated into all elements of business planning and decision-making,
and fostering openness and dialogue with employees and the public.7 7

Secondly, the documents of the GC refer to Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration, which requires that states take "responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."7 8 The
combination of these two very different expectations means that Principle 8 is still
very open-textured and vague despite the connections that the GC tries to develop
between it and international environmental soft law more generally. This is
because the link it has with the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 are constructed
without them being apparent, as is the case with the precautionary approach, for
instance. The lack of an apparent intersubjective framework means that the
vagueness inherent in the concepts in Principle 8 has different functional
implications for social learning than Principle 7.
Principle 9 requires that "business should encourage the development and
diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies." 79 Given the reliance of the
other two principles on Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, this principle appears
to have been directly adapted from Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration, which
requires that:
States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for

sustainable development by improving scientific understanding through

74. U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles-Principle8, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle8.html (last visited Nov.15, 2009).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. AGENDA 21, supranote 68, at 130.26.
78. Rio Declaration,supranote 73.
79. U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles Principle 9, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle9.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
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exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing
the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies,
including new and innovative technologies.80
The idea that states should adopt the "best available technology" or "best
practical means" for doing something is a common requirement of many
multilateral agreements, and therefore more could have been added to the
provisions of these principles had the GC chosen to do so. 81 Compared with
Principles 7 and 8, this principle is arguably more defined but still remains open
textured in the direction it gives to actors.
This discussion highlights the possibility that these environmental principles,
which have developed out of qualitative concepts like "precaution" or
"responsibility," might encourage a range of actors with a variety of beliefs to
internalize their meaning for themselves. Actors have different values and beliefs
behind why they might protect and preserve the natural environment and resources.
These values and beliefs elicit not only different responses from actors, but the
depth of reaction to the same problem might also vary significantly.8 2 For instance,
a state might preserve a rainforest for its biodiversity but may also do so because
of the aesthetic, spiritual, historical, or symbolic value that it has for all or
particular parts of its current or future population. The diversity of values in the
context of a regime like the GC, where corporations and other stakeholders like
governments, civil society, and labor organizations are involved in different ways
is bound to be significant.
Additionally, the GC has generated principles in terms that presume their
relevance for what corporations might value. This suggests that identifying what
relevance the principles have for corporations is in itself a function of the GC
governance framework rather than something to be presumed. It also means that to
view the GC environmental principles as a norm that requires compliance
constitutes approaching their role and function in potentially unproductive ways. In
fact, Kell and Ruggie, as two main architects and drivers of the GC, have noted
that it was not designed as a code of conduct. They write that: "Instead, it is meant
to serve as a framework of reference and dialogue to stimulate best practices and to
bring about convergence in corporate practices around universally shared
80. Rio Declaration,supranote 73.
81. See Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art 6, openedfor signatureNov.
13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,541, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983) (requiring that
states adopt the "best available technology"); The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art.
194, openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No., 103-39 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994) (requiring that states adopt what are practically the best available means at their
disposal to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment). Other treaties reference
the principles in water pollution agreements. See Convention of the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, openedfor signature Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M
1312 (entered into force Oct. 6, 1996); Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic, openedfor signature Sept. 22, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1069 (entered into force on Mar.
25, 1998) [hereinafter OSPAR Convention].
82. This point has been used for criticizing the use of abstract principles within the GC
framework. See Deva, supranote 2, at 129-33.
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values." 83 In other words, the participation of corporations is important for creating
meaning from the environmental principles used in the GC and it cannot be
presumed that they are values to which corporations naturally relate.
The relevance of the abstract and open-textured style of Principles 7, 8, and 9
in the GC as discussed can also be contextualized by comparing them with other
voluntary codes developed internationally for transnational corporations. For
instance, the OCED Guidelines also provides recommendations for how
international businesses should conduct themselves in relation to a range of areas,
including the protection of the environment.8 4 In comparison, for instance, the
OECD Guidelines do not use an abstract abbreviation of the precautionary
principle but instead define it in full and in a way that has subtle and important
differences to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. 5 In other words, they seek to
specify in a more precise way how the precautionary principle has to be interpreted
by the international business community. This does not appear to have provided
effectively for the application of the precautionary principle to corporations, as is
apparent for instance in the issues raised during the 2004 Annual Meeting which
reviewed the OECD Guidelines.8 6 This is because certain concepts-like risk-are
open textured and potentially applicable to all sorts of instances of corporate
activity. More importantly, what constitutes an acceptable approach to risk was
identified as important for the public sector to define rather than individual
corporations, which might vary significantly in their approaches. 87 It appears from
83. Georg Kell & John Ruggie, Global Markets and Social Legitimacy: The Casefor the "Global
Compact" 8(3) TRANSNAT'L CORPS. 101, 104 (1999).
84. In particular, Ch. 5 of the OECD Guidelines provides eight different, fairly detailed
recommendations for international business. The Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], The
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary and Clarifications, at 28-29,
OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL (2001).
85. The OECD Guidelinesprovides that:
Consistent with the scientific and technical understanding of the risks, where there are threats of serious
damage to the environment, taking also into account human health and safety, not use the lack of full
scientific certainty as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent or minimize such
damage.
Id. at 28.
86. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, ROUNDTABLE ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: ENCOURAGING THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS TO
ENVIRONMENT THROUGH THE OCED GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES-SUMMARY OF
THE ROUNDTABLE DiscussioN (June 16, 2004), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/24/33805553.pdf. See also

Elisa Morgera, An Environmental Outlook on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:
ComparativeAdvantage, Legitimacy, and Outstanding Questions in the Lead Up to the 2006 Review, 18
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 751 (2006) (discussing the environmental provisions of the OECD
Guidelines).
87. In the report of the 2004 meeting it was noted that:
[W]hereas the question of where to draw the line between government and corporate responsibility is an
important cross-cutting issue, it is, particularly pertinent in the context of risk management. As a
corporate representative said, few, if any activities are risk-less and so it is unrealistic to expect
companies to shun all environmental risks. This is one reason why companies cannot be left alone
managing risk; there needs to be a degree of involvement on the part of government and civil society to
discuss inter alia what constitutes acceptable risk levels.
OECD DIRECTORATE, supranote 86, at 8.
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this that spelling out particular formulations of the ideas contained within
abstractly defined environmental principles does not necessarily predispose them
to being applied more easily by corporations.
The next section discusses the potential of corporations to actually share a
culture at the international level, one which values anything in particular that is
traditionally of concern to the public at large and to states in particular. This
argument seeks to position the environmental principles as norms that have
significance for how corporations might be learning to collectively identify with a
particular culture rather than to regulate how they should act in particular ways.
III. COLLECTIVE LEARNING THROUGH THE GLOBAL COMPACT
An important criticism of the GC discussed above relates to whether the
objectives of the UN expressed through the principles and the GCO can be
reconciled with the needs and preferences of private enterprise. 8 As an alternative,
Ruggie has argued that, although the principles established as part of the GC were
developed by states, their adoption by corporations suggests that they are also able
to "encompass the sphere of transnational corporate activity." 89 Part of the
difficulty with this debate is the presumption that the principles are values and that
the GC is being built on a value-based platform. As discussed above, the
environmental principles of the GC are open-textured or abstract norms that
require actors to engage with them in order to create meaning from them.
The important question seems to be whether corporations are capable of
"genuinely political activity" within the international order, either within or "apart
from" the system of states. 90 States engage in politics because they might be trying
to solve cooperation problems by creating norms and transacting together.
Ideational and normative structures develop, for instance, out of needing to solve
issues that require the cooperation of actors such as preventing the depletion of the
ozone layer. Whether the direct or diffused interactions of corporations with each
other are capable of generating shared culture or intersubjectivity is an important
issue. The potential of abstract and open norms like environmental principles to
generate meaning for a group of corporations should not necessarily be presumed.
Traditionally, it has been the ability of corporations or civil society
organizations to pressure states, intergovernmental negotiations, and international
agencies that has dominated research agendas. 91 This research agenda is a
reflection of a dominant and persistent ideology that still sees states as "the
88. See ENGSTROM, supranote 15, at 46-48.
89. Ruggie, supranote 64, at 516.
90. Id. at 502. See also Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and
World Civic Politics, 47(3) WORLD POLITICS 311 (1995) (for a discussion of world civil politics as
practiced by NGO's, TEAG's & environmental activists and how this discussion is relevant to the study
of world politics). Some have in fact turned these issues around and have investigated the potential role
of private actors to compensate for the lack of initiative shown by states to fix or provide public goods,
See Christoph Knill & Dirk Lehmkuhl, PrivateActors and the State: Internationalizationand Changing
Patternsof Governance, 15 GOVERNANCE 41 (2002).
91. See, e.g., MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
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primary form of political organization." 92 There are different ways in which the
role of transnational corporations and civil society organizations are being
rationalized within the international order in relation to public matters like the
environment. Wapner, in 1995, developed the idea of "world civic politics" to
argue that, at the international level, there was political activity apart from the
state.93 A second idea points out that there are "deeper processes of globalization at
work that are producing a disengagement of law and state."94 This liberates other
entities, including individuals and transnational corporations, to have a significant
say in the processes of globalization.95 Importantly, Cutler has argued that the main
problem with questions about the political activity of entities like transnational
corporations is that "conventional theories of international relations and
international law are incapable of capturing" private authority.96 She argues that
the "analytical, theoretical and ideological orientations" of these disciplines render
such authority "non sequitur." 97 In the case of many approaches to international
relations, states are still the primary actors responsible for change within the
international order.98 Public international law is even more explicitly state-centric,
as it provides that only states can create law. 99 These ideas suggest the potential
difficulty with transnational corporations shaping their own collective
understanding of culture or norms relating to public issues.100
There is also the challenge of basing discussions of the political activities of
corporations around norms. This is captured by Sol Picciotto, who highlights the
"complex and multi-layered interactions between laws, codes and guidelines,
operating locally, nationally, transnationally, regionally, and internationally."10 1
Santos also makes similar points in stating that: "Our... life is constituted by an
intersection of different legal orders, that is by interlegality. Interlegality is the...

92. Ruggie, supranote 64, at 502.
93. Wapner, supra note 90. See also Ruggie, supranote 64 (considering this idea in the context of
the GC).
94. A. Claire Cutler, Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation, in THE
EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 33 (Rodney H. Bruce &

Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
95. See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 181-82 (2d

ed., LexisNexis Butterworths 2002) (discussing how these transnational identities are affecting and
deepening the process of globalization through their global influence).
96. CUTLER, supra note 94, at 2.

97. Id.
98. See Ronen Palan, Recasting Political Authority: Globalization and the State, in
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CRITICS: PERSPECTIVES FROM POLITICAL ECONOMY

139, 140 (Randall

Germain ed., 2000).
99. For instance, the I.C.J. only recognizes the role of civilized nations in creating general
principles of law. See Statute of the I.C.J. art. 38(1)(c) (1946).
100. For a good survey and examination of the role of "multinational enterprises" in governance,
see Lee Tavis, Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487
(2002).
101. Sol Picciotto, Introduction: What Rules for the World Economy?, in REGULATING
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BEYOND LIBERALIZATION 17 (Sol Picciotto and Ruth Mayne eds., 1999),

(citing Scott H. Jacobs, Regulatory Co-operationfor an Interdependent World: Issuesfor Government',
in Regulatory Cooperationfor an Interdependent World, OECD, Paris (1994)).
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key... post-modem conception of law."1 02 These ideas suggest that, even if we are
able to observe change in corporate behavior toward a more socially responsible
approach, ascertaining its cause in a complex world is difficult if not impossible.
On the other hand, Cutler has argued in her scholarship on private authority that
"the mercatocracy [actually] functions to provide a unity of purpose and a
coherence in regulation... ."10 She suggests that this is "obscured by notions of
pluralistic or fragmented governance." 104 That is, concepts and ideas used in public
international law make the mercatocracy appear more fragmented and pluralistic
than they are.105 Cutler's views imply that the approaches of corporations to issues
are not that seemingly fragmented to prevent its study or even to suggest that they
can potentially instantiate cultures of particular kinds. 106 The issue of concern is
more in terms of the indeterminate nature of how corporations come to prefer
certain things, as highlighted by Santos and Sol Picciotto in the above references to
their work, rather than whether they can collectively identify with something in
particular.
A. Engagement and the Instantiation of a Collective Culture Through the Global
Compact
It is therefore arguably important to consider why corporations might work
together or participate in collectively organized initiatives, as well as whether they
can or will engage in political activities at the international level-in other words,
why corporations might wish to interact directly or diffusely through, for instance,
the GC. In a 2007 study, McKinsey & Company, who interviewed around 391
chief executive officers (CEOs) and top executives of corporations who were at
that time participants in the GC, noted the following: "Most businesses are facing
overwhelmingly large ESG issues that span regions and industries, and threaten
their long-term viability. More and more, businesses are collaborating to level the
playing field-working in multi-sector partnerships with civil society
organizations, governments, and each other."10 7 This comment highlights both the
pressure to take responsibility for environmental stewardship and the need to level
the playing field as reasons why corporations might collaborate through the GC.
McKinsey & Company also asked leaders within corporations to select
"developments linked to accelerated global patterns of growth as the three most

102. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 95, at 473.

103. CUTLER, supra note 94, at 31.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Peter T. Muchlinski, "Global Bukowina" Examined: Viewing the Multinational
Enterprise as a TransnationalLaw-Making Community, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 79-108
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
107. McKINSEY & COMPANY, SHAPING THE NEW RULES OF COMPETITION: UN GLOBAL COMPACT

PARTICIPANT MIRROR 2, 24 (2007), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/
summit2007/mckinseyembargoed until020707.pdf. The abbreviation ESG used in this quote refers to
"environmental, social and governance," id. at 6. In this same study, McKinsey & Company report that
95% of the 391 CEOs of companies they spoke to "agreed that society has greater expectations for
business to take on public responsibilities than it had 5 years ago," id at 7.
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important trends that are influencing society's expectations on businesses."1 0 8
From their responses, represented in Figure 4, corporations understand the severity
of the pressure on them to deal with environmental concerns. In this same 2007
study, McKinsey & Company also reported that many of the corporate leaders they
surveyed indicated that they viewed the GC as "one example of a coalition
organized around a wider set of ESG issues."1 09 Arguably, the GC is seen, amongst
other things, as giving corporations the chance to establish a level playing field in
terms of the social responsibility that is increasingly called for.
Figure 4 Trends influencing society's expectations of business
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Whether this belief is driven by "microeconomic imperatives," or whether it
emerges from a sense of wanting to take socially and environmentally responsible
actions cannot easily be separated."' From the beginning, however, the UN
partnership with corporations through the GC was driven by the ideology that free

108. Id. at 10.
109. Id. at 24. There are many other ways to conceptualize why corporations might choose to join
the GC. For instance, during an interview Norwegian companies said that the GC gives their companies
"a 'social licence to operate'; It is beneficial to the companies' reputation management, brand image,
employee satisfaction, recruitment, stakeholder relations, customer satisfaction etc." Gjolberg and
Ruud, supra note 6, at 11.
110. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, supra note 107, at 11.
111. See, Kell, supranote 20, at 74.
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trade and open markets would be enhanced through more socially responsible
behavior. 112 That is, the GC sought to encourage changes in the way money was
made rather than to create growth by adopting restrictions on corporate
behaviour.1 13 This rhetoric plays itself out in a variety of ways within the work of
the GC. For instance, the GCO has encouraged corporations to place importance
on the cost-effectiveness of protecting the environment. In one of its guides to the
GC, it has suggested that the precautionary approach to doing business means
avoiding damage to the environment because it is cheaper than remedying it in the
future.114 They note that an investment in environmentally safer production
methods saves money in the long term. 115
The culture the GC is seeking to promote appears to encourage an approach to
markets that is encapsulated by ideas developed within ecological economics. 116
According to Daly, who is arguably amongst the pre-eminent scholars in this field,
sustainable or ecological economics is based on distinguishing between the ideas
of development and growth. 1 7 Daly has written that:
To grow means to "increase naturally in size by the addition of material
through assimilation or accretion." To develop means "to expand or
realize the potentialities of; to bring gradually to a fuller, greater, or
better State." When something grows it gets bigger. When something
develops it gets different. The earth ecosystem develops (evolves), but
[it] does not grow. Its subsystem, the economy, must eventually stop
growing, but can continue to develop. The term "sustainable
development" therefore makes sense for the economy, but only if it is
8
understood as "development" without growth.11

112. ENGSTROM, supra note 15, at 11. Engstrom notes that this dimension of the GC has been
criticized as giving in to the realpolitik of the balance of power internationally. Id at 11. See in
particular the comment from the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his statement at the
launch of the GC in 1999 suggesting that the UN should "help make the case for and maintain an
environment which favours trade and open markets." Press Release, Secretary General, SecretaryGeneral Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/6881(Feb.
1,
1999),
available
at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/
19990201.sgsm6881.html.
113. ENGSTROM, supra note 15, at 11.
114. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT: A PRACTICAL
UNDERSTANDING
OF THE
VISION AND
NINE PRINCIPLES
54
(2002), available at

http://www.cosco.com/en/pic/research/7573381391844063.pdf

[hereinafter GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL

COMPACT].

115. Id.
116. This discussion aims to illustrate the idea of a cultural shift rather than defend it. As a result,
the discussion of ecological economics is not particularly detailed. For more information, see e.g.
Herman Daly, Sustainable Growth: An Impossibility Theorem, in VALUING THE EARTH 267 (Herman
Daly and Kenneth Townsend eds., 1993), available at http://dieoff.org/page37.htm; JOSEPH R.
DESJARDINS, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 87

(Thomson Wadsworth 4th ed. 2006). For an insightful and powerful critique, see MARK SAGOFF,
PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 177-200 (2004).
117. See DESJARDINS, supranote 116, at 87; see also Daly, supranote 116.
118. Daly, supra note 116, 267-68.
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To illustrate, ecological economics can usefully be contrasted to alternative
ideological approaches to consumption and production. The first of these is the
traditional market economics model, which deals with the allocation of resources
by giving priority to those who are willing to pay the most for them. 119 Also,
whether a particular resource is developed and distributed is based simply on
conceptions of consumer demand for that resource. 120 In contrast, through
ecological economics, the use of resources is "only at a rate that can be sustained
over the long term and one that recycles or reuses both the by-products of the
production process and the products themselves."1 21 Amongst other things, a
culture driven by the ideas behind ecological economics would, for instance, not
produce goods simply because there is consumer demand for them. The production
of particular goods would be limited by the potential renewal of those natural
resources needed for the process. 122
An alternative ideological and cultural approach to ecological economics
examines the lifestyle that society is seeking to sustain while we become more
aware of the impact we have on the environment and our resource use. Ecological
economics is critical of the idea of sustaining our current consumption and
production patterns. 121 One approach comes from Sagoff, who criticises the
emphasis on "scarcity and overconsumption."1 24 His arguments are complex, and a
summary would not do justice to them. This approach is based on a critique of
using the concept of scarcity to drive our understanding of consumption and
production in ecological economics because we then value nature as a resource.125
Instead, Sagoff emphasizes spiritual, aesthetic, and ethical approaches to valuing
goods, nature, and the environment. 126 These alternative approaches to ecological
economics are presented here to illustrate the other end of the spectrum on which
the standard model of market economics lies.
Generally speaking, the idea that people in any society would accept
restrictions on their consumer preferences is visionary, given current standards of
living in the developed world in particular. This suggests that the structural power
of the kind of culture for which ecological economists argue is yet to dominate
general consumption and production patterns around the world. Although there
will be natural exceptions, the culture defended by traditional market economics is
generally taken for granted. More importantly, it is difficult to see how
corporations will support an alternative culture to consumerism. In fact, it was
argued back in 1962 that our corporations were not designed or created to support
social responsibility for protecting the environment. 127 Fitzmaurice has also argued

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

DESJARDINS, supranote 116, at 87.
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id. at 89.

124. Id. at 90; See e.g., SAGOFF, supranote 116, at 175.
125. DESJARDINS, supranote 116, at 90.
126. SAGOFF, supra note 116, at 1-3.
127. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-36 (49th anniversary ed., 1962).
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that environmental norms have not had much of a binding influence on the
transnational mercatocracy.128
The point being made here is that a corporation's preferences and wants vary
significantly from those of other actors, whose deeper values and beliefs are not
entirely shaped by approaches to consumption and production. For corporations to
adopt preferences in favor of environmental ideals that protect future generations,
or for them to restrain how they respond to potential consumer demands, is in itself
a normative shift in behavior. This is because the more familiar environmental
concerns of corporations are with liabilities and damage to current populations
rather than restraining production on the basis of the belief that it is better for the
environment. The suggestion, therefore, that corporate behavior and culture could
change as dramatically as required by ecological economics is difficult to foresee.
This discussion does not suggest that the shift in culture or the way
corporations view and approach their business is likely to be swift. The
instantiation of a particular culture is in itself a collective learning experience. It is
arguable that corporations are beginning to take steps to instantiate a collective
culture globally where the approaches of ecological economics within business
might become the norm rather than the exception. In a survey of 400 companies
completed by the GCO in 2007, it was illustrated that an important proportion of
the businesses surveyed had some kind of environmental policies or practices in
place. 129 The findings are presented in Figure 5.

128. Malgosia Fiztmaurice, The ContributionofEnvironmentalLaw to the Development of Modern
InternationalLaw, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 12ST CENTURY:
ESSAYS INHONOUR OF KRYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 909 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
129. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supra note 7, at 9, 33. From the 400 companies that responded to the
GCO survey, 28% had more than 10,000 employees; 41% had between 250 and 10,000 and 32% had
fewer than 250 employees. Id. at 9.
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Figure 5 Implementation of Environmental Policies and Practices by
Corporations Across Countries and Regions130
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According to the research presented in Figure 5, a significant proportion of
those corporations that have adopted environmental policies or practices have more
than 10,000 employees, which often means that they are large transnational
corporations.1 3 1 This is important because of their capacity to locate production
across national borders, to trade across frontiers, exploit foreign markets, and
organize managerial structures in a way that affects the international allocation of
resources. 132 Also, because the production and distribution networks of
transnational corporations usually span across many jurisdictions, they are more

130. Id at 33.
131. Id
132. ENGSTROM, supra note 15, at 5; see also PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 15 (Oxford University Press 2nd ed., 2007) (1995).
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likely to have an influence on a variety of different stakeholders.133 As a result, a
shift in the practices of transnational corporations is likely to be a much stronger
instantiation of an emerging global culture driven by an ecological approach to
issues of production and consumption.
In the 2007 McKinsey & Company report referred to earlier in relation to
Figure 4,134 it was noted that "many CEOs recognize the underlying tension
between business models wedded to increasing patterns of consumption, and the
reality of limited natural resources." 35 The findings of the McKinsey & Company
report and those of the GCO discussed above strongly suggest that companies have
started to rethink their approach to how they drive consumption of certain goods
and their involvement in the extraction of natural resources for their production.
This discussion does not suggest that the GC can of itself achieve the cultural shift
of corporations taking ecological approaches to consumption and production. In
fact, given the earlier references to the work of Santos and Sol Picciotto, it would
be inaccurate to identify a likely cause for such a cultural shift in the global
patterns of growth. Despite this, the framework of the GC and the environmental
principles within it can potentially shape and manage the interactions of
corporations, particularly the 100-plus transnational corporations which are
members of it, to instantiate or provide support for the development of such a
cultural shift. For instance, the diffusion of ideas amongst corporations and the
type of identity that the COP policy of the GCO creates are potentially capable of
establishing an important measure for instantiating a collective culture at the
international level.
IV. DIFFUSION AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT

Not all ideas relating to how corporations should behave are socially
influential enough for them to be adopted or internalized. The scholarship on social
leaming and socialization in international relations has developed a focus on the
concept of diffusion because it explains one of the reasons why actors might
internalize particular ideas or intersubjective structures like normS. 136 The diffusion
of ideas, things, practices, norms, or policies is another way of referring to a
process whereby innovations are "communicated... over time among members of

133. ENGSTROM, supra note 15, at 5. See also, MUCHLINSKI, supra note 132, at 15. See, DAVID
HELD, ANTHONY
McGREw,
DAVID
GOLDBLATT &
JONATHAN
PERRATON,
GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 237 (1999) (discussing the role of
transnational corporations and global production).
134. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, supra note 107, at 11.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Kai Alderson, Making Sense of State Socialization, 27 REV. INT'L STUDIES 415, 424-25
(2001). On the idea that international organizations teach and diffuse norms, see Martha Finnemore,
InternationalOrganizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organizationand Science Policy, 47 INT'L ORG. 565, 585-86 (1993); Alexandru Grigorescu,
European Institutions and Unsuccessful Norm Transmission: The Case of Transparency, 39(4) INT'L
POLITICS 467, 467 (2002). For a more general review of diffusion in the context of international
relations, see Emily Goldman & Leslie Eliason, Introduction: Theoretical and Comparative
Perspectives on Innovation and Diffusion, in THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND IDEAS 1,

11-22. (Emily Goldman & Leslie Eliason eds., 2003).
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the social system." 1 37 Not all ideas that are diffused, however, are subsequently
adopted or utilized in particular instances. 3 Becoming aware of an idea does not
necessarily suggest that actors will adopt or internalize it within their practices. 139
The idea that actors like corporations might emulate or model themselves on
what they see in others is a concept used in the scholarship on diffusion to describe
how ideas spread across the globe. 140 The main rationale for emulating someone or
modelling what they do is the importance often placed on ideas that are readily
available and have been tried elsewhere to solve or deal with similar problems or
issues. 141 Braithwaite and Drahos distinguish modelling (or emulation) from
imitation by suggesting that it is a process with cognitive content because ideas are
communicated to others using words or images.142 As a result, emulation might
mean that a policy will only be used to shift agendas rather than that actors will do
exactly what others have done in the past. 143
Emulating or modelling as a social process is even more likely to be the case
when actors like corporations exist in a competitive global business environment.
Although Ikenberry, in the following quote, is writing about states, the ideas share
a degree of resonance with transnational and other corporations:
It appears that emulation will be most pervasive when international
competition is most intense, inasmuch as competition provides a
powerful incentive to monitor and respond to innovations developed
abroad. In cases of intense competition, the costs of failing to innovate
are highest. Moreover, the diffusion of policy practices is most likely to
occur when states share underlying cultural or social settings (although a

137. See EVERETT ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed.1995), quoted in Helge Jorgens,
Governance by Diffusion: Implementing Global Norms Through Cross-national Imitation and
Learning, in GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THE CHALLENGES OF ADAPTING FORM

TO FUNCTION 246, 252 (William Lafferty ed., 2004).
138. This conceptual distinction is emphasized by Goldman & Eliason, supra note 136, at 12.

Goldman & Eliason point to the following research as shaping this idea that they summarize in their
work: Colin Bennett, How States Utilize Foreign Evidence, 11(1) J. PUB. POLICY 31, 32-33 (1991);
Colin Bennett, What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It? 21 BRIT. J. OF POL. SCIENCE 215, 22223 (1991); Colin Bennett, Understanding Ripple Effects: The Cross-National Adoption of Policy
Instrumentsfor BureaucraticAccountability, 10(3) GOVERNANCE 213, 214 (1997).
139. Bennett, How States Utilize ForeignEvidence, supra note 138, at 32-33 (arguing that there is
a difference between "knowledge of a foreign program, utilization of that knowledge, and the adoption
of the same program").
140. On emulation and diffusion, see in particular John Ikenberry, The InternationalSpread of
Privatization Policies: Inducements, Learning, and Policy Bandwagoning, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION 88, 90 (Ezra Suleiman & John Waterbury

eds., 1990). On modelling and diffusion, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 539 (2000).

141. Kurt Weyland, The Diffusion of Innovations: A Theoretical Analysis, paper presented at the
97th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, (Aug. 29 - Sept. 1, 2002),
quoted in Jorgens, supra note 124, at 252.
142. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 140, at 25.

143. Bennett, What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?, supranote 125, at 221.
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highly competitive environment might serve to transcend obstacles
presented by divergent cultural or societal circumstances). 144
In a competitive environment, corporations are likely to be looking for ideas
and innovations that might enhance their goals and objectives. Given that
corporations generally aim to increase their annual profits, a competitive
environment would strongly favor emulating successful initiatives or modelling
themselves to be like their peers.145
This is not to suggest that competition and the pressure for corporations to
emulate or model themselves on success have to be viewed in one-dimensional
terms. The pressure to be more socially responsible in protecting the environment
from harm and depletion of natural resources is also likely to influence
corporations to emulate others who have done this successfully. 146 As a result,
companies feeling pressure from shareholders, consumers, distributors, or the
general public would identify with other corporations who have strongly
performed in taking responsibility toward environmental stewardship. This
suggests that they are more likely to emulate or model themselves on others
because their competitive position in the market could easily be impacted in the
long run if they do not take appropriate steps in this direction.
Modelling or emulating what others do is also more about identifying with
others than simply making a rational choice to pursue a particular end. 147 This idea
can be illustrated by reference to a study of Samarco Salvamar (which produces
iron ore pellets), published through the GCO. 148 The authors of the study note that
in 1990 the company analyzed 250 profitable corporations and selected twenty-five
149
to emulate or on which to model its own operations.
Samarco Salvamar
developed projects and integrated management models into its practices, including
environmental ones, by drawing from the experiences of the twenty-five
companies it had selected for study. 150 This suggests that, although Samarco
Salvamar was rational in how it approached its operations, its decisions were
constructed by what it observed in the twenty-five corporations it studied.
The potential for ideas to diffuse amongst corporations who are participants in
the GC is likely to be strong. This is because of the pressure they must feel not
only to perform competitively to increase profits, but also to act in more socially
responsible ways-particularly in relation to the environment. The demonstration
of successful innovations in relation to environmental initiatives that can generate
income for corporations is likely to have an important causal effect on them. There
are at least three arguments as to how corporations, as participants of the GC, are
144. Ikenberry, supranote 140, at 103, quoted in Goldman & Eliason, supranote 136, at 15-16.
145. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 140, at 539.
146. See discussion supra Figure 4 (summarizing some of the findings of the 2007 McKinsey &
Company report, particularly in relation to the pressures on CEOs to be socially responsible).
147. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 140, at 30.

148. Cldudio Bruzzi Boechat & Fundaglio Dom Cabral, One Company, One Idea: Samarco
Salvamar Project, in EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supranote 46, at 37, 37-38.

149. Id. at 38.
150. Id.
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likely to increase the potential for the diffusion of ideas through emulation or
modelling because of the social influence that others might have directly or
diffusely on the participants:1 5 1
1. In the 2007 survey completed by the GCO, it was reported that 63%
of the companies that had joined the GC did so to encourage the
general public to "increase trust" in them. 152 In addition, 53% were
there to network with others.153 This compares with 20% who
wanted to improve their market access to their business. 154 This
suggests that the potential of social influence during their
interactions in any GC initiatives is more likely than not because
otherwise
their engagement with others might prove
counterproductive. For instance, misrepresentations by companies
might lead certain stakeholders like NGOs to label them as bluewashing their image, which might in turn impact their image
internationally. 1 5
2.

The GCO has reported that, in 2007, 69% of their participants were
actively communicating with them on the progress they were making
toward implementing the core principles of the GC. 15 6 As previously
discussed,15 7 these reports are publicly available for comments from
GC stakeholders, and are published on the official Web site of the
GC for the general public to view. Competitors of corporations that
submit a COP can easily view their reports and assess how they
perform in terms of implementing the environmental principles.

3.

Some corporations themselves take an active role within the GC
framework in diffusing ideas and innovations that are consistent with
the core principles. For instance, the BMW Group has put itself
forward to share its work through case studies on how its operations
and those of its subsidiaries implement the GC principles. 58 A case
study produced by Designworks, a subsidiary of BMW in the United
States, highlights its sustainability management system. It points out
that it produced the study to "share its practices with other

151. This is not to suggest that there are not any other opportunities for diffusion of ideas and
innovations within the GC framework. These are just three important ones that an analysis of the GC
framework reveals as potentially useful for the purposes of diffusion.
152. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supranote 7, at 11.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Bigge, supranote 6, at 7.
156. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supranote 7, at 51.
157. See McKiNSEY & COMPANY, supra note 2.
158. The first case study was produced by the Center for Responsible Business at the University of
California, Berkeley. Kellie McElhaney, Michael Toffel & Natalie Hill, Designing Sustainability at
BMW Group: The Designworks/USA Experience 2 (Ctr. for Responsible Bus., Univ. of Cal., Working
Paper
No.
4,
2002),
available at http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/responsiblebusiness/
documents/BMW.pdf. The second report is part of a case study series produced by the Global Compact
Office, From Principlesto Practice, supranote 46, at 1.
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companies interested in the Global Compact." 159 Importantly, in
another case study, a medium-sized company in Poland, Yawal
System, highlighted how showing leadership had potential to
contribute to diffusion. Yawal System sees the dissemination of
"information and experiences gained with other local companies" as
acting in an environmentally responsible way. 160
In these direct and diffuse interactions that corporations might have with
others, the role and function of principles as part of the social process of diffusion,
and the emulation or modelling of what some do, become more apparent. Ideas or
innovations are more socially influential and will potentially diffuse across the GC
framework because they are meaningful to actors who might view them through
the cognitive frame established by either the abstract nature of the principles or
because they fit within their understanding of the qualitative dimensions of the
open-textured concepts in the principles. The social responsibility of corporations
for the environment is bound to be a relative rather than an absolute idea for
corporations, given their limited practices in this area as discussed earlier in this
chapter.161 As a result, they are more likely to engage with ideas and innovations
that fit within a cognitive frame that establishes a level playing field for themselves
and their peers. This doesn't suggest that the environmental principles of the GC
harmonize or necessarily bring about a convergence of practices.162 Actors who
actively engage with the principles give meaning to them by adopting practices
that are more consistent with their own corporate image and profile. The cognitive
frame established by the principles is more likely to cause a range of ideas and
innovations that might suit a greater diversity of corporations to emulate than if
rules and standards, which are more defined, were used as part of the GC. In fact, it
has been suggested that "diffusion appears far less deterministic and much more
vulnerable to local conditions than the systemic view suggests."1 63 That is, the
practices of corporations are less likely to imitate the exact ideas and innovations
that others promote, yet remain within the frame established by environmental
principles. This potentially engages a greater diversity of participants in a process
that is no less likely to instantiate a collective culture of the kind described above.
It is possible to illustrate the strength and significance of this interplay
between environmental principles and diffusion in terms of how it promotes a
diversity of social practices through two different examples of innovative practices
of corporations. Both of these examples fit within the frame vaguely established by
Principle 8 relating to corporations taking responsibility for the environment.
159. Id. at 15.
160. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, supranote 114, at 61.
161. See discussion supra Part 3 and Figure 5.
162. Although this article discusses diffusion in the context of collective culture and learning, it
must be pointed out that this is not the same as suggesting that corporations, through the GC, are
harmonizing their approaches to environmental issues. Harmonization assumes that all actors will
internalize the same norm, which means the same things to all of them. Given the need for actors to
participate in generating meaning from environmental principles, this article does not argue that
corporation's views are being harmonized by them.
163. Eliason & Goldman, supranote 136, at 8.
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These two examples have been distributed through one of the structured learning
environments created by the GCO.
The first is in a case study distributed by the GCO relating to British
Petroleum (BP), which in 1998 committed itself to reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions (GGE) to 10% below 1990 levels by 2010.164 Each of the Business
Units (BU) of BP are given annual emission allocations. In 2000, one of its BU
upgraded its activities, which would cause it to exceed its allocated GGE. It bought
allowances from another BU of BP that had recently upgraded a furnace, which
had given it some spare allowances. 161 In this example, the potential for growth did
not push BP to adopt an alternative preference of increasing its GGE.
In a different case study, also distributed by the GCO, Eskom (the largest
supplier of electricity in Africa) is noted in 2000 to have introduced a demand-side
management (DSM) system giving customers the option to use less electricity
during peak periods and to save money as a result. 166 With drops in consumption,
this would significantly delay the need for Eskom to upgrade its networks and
build additional power plants.167 Eskom established a DSM department to educate
the community about the potential to consume electricity in a sustainable way. 168
In reducing electricity consumption, Eskom also reduced the total GGE from
power stations. 16 9 The environmental gains from this initiative would have been
significant, given that the electricity sector in 2003 contributed to 15% of South
Africa's gross domestic product.17 0 Its corporate identity would probably have
matured into a consumer-oriented transnational corporation. Other corporations
may not only model themselves on Eskom when faced with problems that require
financial solutions, but might proactively consider developing practices that would

enhance their market presence.
Comparing the above two examples highlights the different approaches taken
to reducing GGEs. Although their reasons for doing so were different, both
companies are able to claim greater relative responsibility for protecting the
environment. BP made internal changes to the way it managed its business units
whereas Eskom sought to change consumer demand for its products. This suggests
that both activities would be meaningful to different corporations because Principle
8 is able to accommodate a variety of ways in which ideas might diffuse across to
other corporations who, like them, are seeking to modify their practices.
Some might argue that the cognitive frame is too broadly established through
the environmental principles because they encourage diffusion that might be only
164. GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT, supranote 114, at 62.

165. Id.
166. M. Moshoeshoe & D. Sonnenberg, Eskom and the Flexible Hot Water Load Management
Control System, in EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supranote 46, at 65, 66-67.
167. Id. at 72-74.
168. Id. at 66.
169. Cornis Van Der Lugt, Introduction, in EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY,
supranote 46, at 5, 9.
170. Moshoeshoe & Sonnenberg, in EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra
note 166, at 72.
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weakly connected to the kind of stewardship that matters for protecting the
environment and depletion of natural resources. That is, corporations might use the
breadth of the principles to legitimize emulating practices that are less costly to
them. In the context of collective learning of a new culture described above, this is
not necessarily an issue for a longer term view of the kind of role or function that
environmental principles play within the GC. This argument, however, doesn't
deal with the potential that the specific properties of innovations have to cause
diffusion of certain ideas and innovations.1 7 1 That is, the presence of certain
characteristics in ideas and innovations predisposes them to being more easily
diffused than others. In this way, environmental principles are able to frame certain
types and kinds of ideas that more actors want to emulate or model themselves on.
The example discussed in this next section relates to this point because it shows
how the characteristics of an idea can socially influence others not just because
they are cognitively framed by the environmental principles of the GC.
A. SeparatingInnovationfrom the Local Context
It has been argued that diffusion is most successful when policy innovations
can be separated from the "specific national contexts in which they evolved."1 72
This is likely to be even more important in the case of the GC, which engages
corporations from 116 countries around the world. 173 In such cases, the ideas in
themselves can socially influence corporations whether or not they are financially
beneficial to them in the short term. For instance, this can be seen through a
number of case studies conducted for the purposes of distributing them through the
GCO, where there are strong references to transnational and other kinds of
corporations

working

with

external

stakeholders

like

consumers,

non-

governmental organizations, and local communities. For instance, Skanska (a
Swedish construction company), when operating in Sri Lanka, realized that its
success in achieving compliance with ISO 14001 meant that it had to run
"awareness-training program for all employees from the beginning of the
project."1 74 However, in the same case study Skanska is criticized by comments
171. See Jorgens, supra note 13737, at 254-55. The following are important for diffusion:
(1) the existence of international or transnational channels of communication through which
information on policies in other political constituencies can be communicated;
(2) the specific properties of policy innovations;
(3) the specific structure of the problem that a given policy innovation is expected to deal with; and
(4) the national capacities for adopting particular policy innovations.
172. Jorgens, supra note 13737, at 256; See also Paul DiMaggio & Walter Power, The Iron Cage
Revisited: InstitutionalIsomorphism and Collective Rationality in OrganizationalFields,48 AM. Soc.
REV. 147, (1983); David Strang & John Meyer, InstitutionalConditionsfor Diffusion, 22 THEORY AND
Soc'y 487, 491 (1993).
173. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supranote 7, at 8.
174. Hans De Geer & Daniel Stridsman, In Search of Ecological Excellence: Skanska's
Environmental Management at the Kukule Ganga Hydropower Project, in EXPERIENCES IN
MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 46, 13, 19. For information on ISO 14001 as an
environmental management tool, see International Organization for Standardization, ISO 14000
Essentials,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso catalogue/management standards/iso 9000 iso 14000/iso 14000 essential
s.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
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through interviews suggesting that "Skanska could have ensured greater credit for
its environmental work had it engaged more with local communities and NGOs in
dialogue."1 7 5 It cannot be assumed that corporations would necessarily pay
attention to the details of this kind of case study published on the GC website.
However, those interested in implementing ISO 14001 will find this criticism of
Skanska useful for their own management practices.
In an alternative case study, the efforts of Shell International Ltd are
highlighted by the GCO in the way it consulted with local and international nongovernmental organizations and indigenous peoples during an appraisal and
exploration operation in the Camisea region in Peru. 176 Shell also used the
Smithsonian Institute, a corporate/nongovernmental organization-funded body, to
conduct the biodiversity assessment required for the area.17 7 Shell International is
quoted as seeing these measures as building trust between different groups to better
deal with operational issues and to make "positive contribution to conservation."s1 7
This level of engagement with local communities is also clearly visible from other
companies, such as those in the oil and gas industry whose impact on biodiversity
loss is most significant.
As abstract concepts, both the precautionary approach and the need to
promote greater environmental responsibility point to an episteme requiring that
1 79
companies manage "'human beings in their interaction with the environment."'
In the case of the precautionary principle or approach, engaging with local
communities and non-governmental organizations will allow accurate
environmental impact assessments to be prepared before a project begins. It will
also assist with monitoring and precautionary measures to be taken during a

project. In the case of the principle relating to environmental responsibility, the
GCO has pointed out that corporations which have decided to adopt this principle
must "contribute to environmental awareness in company locations" and
"communicate with the local community." 8 o Agenda 21, which is referred to by
the GC in giving its environmental principles a degree of intersubjectivity,
confirms this view by identifying the need for business to foster "openness and
dialogue with employees and the public.""' From these case studies, it would not
be difficult to see how corporations entering new jurisdictions could benefit from
engaging with local communities, delegating responsibility for aspects of the
environmental assessment work to them, and collaborating with local NGOs to
ensure that appropriate precautionary measures are taken based on local knowhow. Both case studies discussed above would serve as useful models for
companies to consider while ensuring they engage with the environmental
principles of the GC.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Van Der Lugt, Introduction,supra note 169, at 7.
GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT, supranote 114, at 56.
See id.
Id.
Van Der Lugt, Introduction,supra note 169, at 6.
GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT, supranote 114, at 59.
AGENDA 21, supranote 68, at 130.3, 30.26.
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This discussion highlights the potential of the environmental principles to
cognitively frame the advantages that come with corporations emulating or
modelling themselves on what others do. The potential breadth of ideas and
innovations that corporations can adopt while they remain engaged with the
principles is clearly an issue. However, this notion is tempered by the idea that
diffusion is in itself a much more complex process that can lead corporations to be
socially influenced to adopt practices that might require more from them than if
they were left to their own devices.
V. IDENTITY AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT

In addition to diffusion, it is also arguable that, through its mandatory
requirements for reporting, the GCO is also helping to define the type of social
identity that some corporations might be willing to adopt as participants of the GC.
Wendt, in his Social Theory of International Politics, describes the potential for
types of identities to develop internationally. 18 2 For instance, an agent could be
typified as a corporation because of the behavioral traits that it might share with
other entities like it. A type of identity exists because actors share certain
characteristics with other actors, which have a social meaning in particular
contexts. The social meaning of a particular type of identity may develop in a
variety of ways-including, for instance, "less formal membership rules that define
what counts as a type identity and orients the behaviour of [o]thers toward it."1 83
To identify something as a particular type of agent does not mean that it operates
in that way under all circumstances. If a type of identity is defined culturally, then
all agents including corporations can identify with different cultural forms in
varying ways and at different times.184 It is the cultural form that an agent takes up
as its identity that also shapes its interests and preferences. 8
The idea that the GC seeks to create "corporate citizenship" through the UN is
consistent with generating a type of a corporation that is a participant in the
developing framework. 18 6 The GCO, in a 2006 study, highlighted that "the
percentage of companies communicating progress increases with the length of their
participation in the Global Compact."187 In this report, the GCO produces figures
that show that 95% of corporations have submitted a COP when they have been
participants in the GC for six years.188 This is comparable to the 27% who submit a
COP after having been a member of the GC for two years. 189 These figures suggest
that membership in the GC is taken more seriously the longer the corporation

182. ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 225 (1999). Wendt's

book is primarily concerned with states, but the theories of symbolic interactionism he draws on
originate from a variety of different sources in the literature on social psychology and arguably have
equal relevance to other corporate actors like transnational and other corporations.
183. Id. at 226.
184. Id. at 230.
185. Id. at 231.
186. On the use of the idea of "corporate citizenship," see discussion supra note 2.
187. LEADING THE WAY, supra note 49, at 5.

188. Id.
189. Id.
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remains a participant in the framework. It also indicates that citizenship or the type
of identity for corporations seems to matter, given the higher percentage of
established members completing a COP. From this, it is arguable that the COP
creates a citizenship test for corporations who wish to remain active participants in
the GC.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a COP must state what a company has
done in support of the GC.1 90 It must describe practical actions it took in the
reporting year to implement its core principles. It must also measure outcomes or
specify what it expects them to be. Finally, the chief executive, chairman or some
other senior executive of the company must cover the COP that is publicly
distributed and put it on the GC website with a letter or a statement giving the GC
its continuing support. 191 For instance, in the covering letter of the COP submitted
by Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), 192 the largest engineering and
manufacturing company in India, the Director for Human Resources wrote the
following:
BHEL is an environment[al] friendly company in all its activities,
products & services, beside[s] providing safe and healthy working
environment to all its stakeholders....The company reiterate[s] its
commitment to United Nation's Global Compact Programme and the set
of core values enshrined in its ten principles on human rights, labour
standards, environment and anti-corruption and intent [sic] to advance
G.C. principles within the company's sphere of influence and has made
it part of the strategy, culture and day-to-day operations.193
It might be argued that the process of committing to the GC and having to
reaffirm this annually seems like a performance. This process is important,

however, in the symbolic effect it has in creating a particular type of a corporation.
Importantly, for companies that have set out their COP in this way it is apparent
that their commitments and how they have implemented them are framed through
the core principles. 194 What this discussion suggests is that the type of corporation
that is created through the GC is managed by environmental principles, creating
for them the terms of their identity within the particular framework. This type of

identity is important for instantiating a collective culture that values the future
through shifts in attitudes to consumerism and production.

190. In relation to the COP, see discussion supra note 49 and accompanying text.
191. POLICY FOR COP, supranote 49, at 1.
192. ANIL SACHDEV, BHEL's COMMITMENT IN SUPPORT OF U.N.G.C. PROGRAMME (June 17,
2009),
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/search
participant.htnl?submit_ x page (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
193. S. K. JAIN, BHEL's COMMITMENT IN SUPPORT OF UN'S GLOBAL COMPACT PROGRAMME
(2007), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/data/ungc cops resources/6D688856-BCEB4600-AB86-3F27657C9EAB/COP.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
194. For example, in a study compiled by the GCO to highlight samples of what other corporations
do, the style of COP used by Grupo Pao de Agicar suggests that principles shape how their reporting is
done, and presumably the way their goals are also established for the following year. See LEADING THE
WAY, supranote 49, at 18, 19.
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VI. CONCLUSION: FUNCTION AND ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES, SOCIAL
LEARNING AND THE GLOBAL COMPACT
From a survey of around 100 Fortune Global 500 companies, Ruggie notes
that "companies generally do not 'adopt'... verbatim" any of the human rights
norms in voluntary codes of conduct developed internationally including the GC
principles. 19 5 "Several indicated in their optional responses that[,] while they were
'influenced by' or 'support[ed]' these instruments, their policies do 'not explicitly
adhere' to or 'explicitly reference' them." 196 This study did not extend to the
environmental principles of the instruments used for the survey, but it is highly
likely that a similar response would be given for the environmental principles of
the GC which, as discussed above, are abstract and open-textured. Given this
possibility, an examination of the ability of environmental principles to interplay
with processes that emphasize social influence might reveal more about their
potential role and function within the GC framework. This is important given the
success of the initiative in establishing a strong membership base amongst
corporations and other stakeholders. It means that less focus needs to be placed on
compliance which might discount the value of the long-term nature of collective
learning and macro-cultural change in international politics, and regulation of the
behavior of actors resulting from it.
Importantly, it cannot be presumed that environmental principles have
established the requisite intersubjectivity to determine corporate practices. This is
so particularly because the international community has not successfully engaged
corporations in shaping how issues of public concern are dealt with. Despite this,
the environmental principles of the GC framework might, through social influence,

give corporations the opportunity to create meaning from them rather than
intersubjectively share in their understanding of protecting the environment from
particular patterns of consumerism or production. That is, as abstract or opentextured norms, they might not establish the precise logic for what is the
appropriate thing to do; however, this does not suggest that initiatives to shift
corporate approaches in favor of taking precautionary measures, for instance, are
not useful. Changes in the individual preferences of corporations of whatever kind
are an instantiation of an emerging culture at the international level. That is, to
shift a particular cultural understanding of consumerism and production,
corporations have to engage in collective learning experiences that can only begin
by socializing them into changing their preferences in favor of taking initiatives
toward environmental stewardship.
It is in the context of this approach to collective learning that this chapter has
explored the role and function of environmental principles within the GC
framework. In focusing on social practices of particular communities of actors, the
particular role and function of environmental principles are more concretely

195. JOHN G. RUGGIE, HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES OF FORTUNE

GLOBAL 500 FIRMS: RESULTS OF A SURVEY 5 (2006), available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-survey-Fortune-Global-500.pdf (last visited May 15, 2008).
196. Id.
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defined and examined. The characterization of environmental principles as
cognitively framing the diffusion of ideas and innovations, and the type of ways
that corporations might identify themselves in relation to others, explains how they
might collectively learn to take ecological approaches to consumerism and
production.
Modelling and emulating what others do can happen because of the social
influence that competition has on corporations that are judged in comparison to
others like them. Also, certain ideas and innovations have greater potential to be
diffused because of their particular qualities which might influence some
corporations. This is because they can be abstracted from the local environment
where they were learned in the first place. Environmental principles can frame how
corporations might react to social influences by making certain things appear
rational or useful to them. For instance, competition might be established on a
more level playing field if corporations know that it is their interpretation of the
three environmental principles of the GC on which they might be judged by the
increasingly sensitive attitudes that the general public has to environmental
stewardship. Alternatively, a particular idea might appear even more useful to a
corporation that can see how the international community has come to
contextualize it in terms of protecting the environment. Engaging local
communities in a project and in environmental impact assessment studies, for
instance, might seem even more rational or useful because it is consistent with
taking a precautionary approach.
Further, the abstractness or the open-textured nature of the environmental
principles means that corporations that do not identify exactly with how others

view stewardship can still engage with and be part of the GC framework. The
greater the number of participants who accept the citizenship test of submitting
COPs will also be instantiating the cultural change discussed above. This is
because of the way that the terms for the type of identity that the GC seeks to
encourage emerge from the corporations interpreting the environmental principles
for themselves. The public nature of the submissions of COPs exposes
corporations to the social influence that others can have on them. The abbreviated
and abstract presentation of the precautionary approach in Principle 7, for instance,
means that stakeholders and the general public can potentially draw from a much
wider range of knowledge areas to influence corporations. Similarly, the opentextured nature of the term "responsibility" in Principle 8 means that the entire
gamut of Chapter 30 of Agenda21 can be deployed in ways that might help to
socially influence corporations through analysis of their COPs. This is not to
suggest that the environmental principles cannot provide the basis for abuse.
However, by establishing the basis for their interplay with particular kinds of
social influence, the GC framework provides a valuable opportunity for
corporations to take seriously the idea of instantiating a culture, which may exert
structural pressure on others that might never align themselves toward taking
social responsibility.

